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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
would further increase the probability of sloppy service. Excep-
tions to actual service, therefore, should be severely limited, lest
the exceptions become the rule.
CPLR 308(3): Server's testimony as to custom and habit allowed
to cure defect in affidavit of service.
In Peninsula National Bank v. Hill,'5 defendant moved to
set aside service of a summons and vacate judgment solely because
of a defect in the affidavit of service. The challenge was made
approximately five and a half years after entry of judgment
following an intentional and deliberate default. Plaintiff's process
server testified he had no recollection of the service, and was
denied by the lower court the opportunity to testify as to his usual
custom and habit in situations requiring substituted service.
The appellate term, second department, however, reversed,
and held that the server's testimony was adequate to establish the
mode of service in the present case and cure the defect in the
affidavit."6
CPLR 308(4).: Court-ordered service on defendant's insurer set
aside.
As the courts order service under CPLR 308(4) with increas-
ing frequency, guidelines continue to be set regarding what methods
of court-ordered service are permissible in certain circumstances.17
Added to the montage is Brodsky v. Spencer."' There, the action
arose from an automobile accident, and service was made by court
order pursuant to 308(4) upon the Secretary of State and the
defendant's insurer. The service was set aside by the same court
as not "reasonably calculated to give the defendant the required
1552 Misc. 2d 903, 277 N.Y.S.2d 162 (App. T. 2d. Dep't 1966).
16Id. at 903, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
17 See, e.g., Sellars v. Raye, 25 App. Div. 2d 757, 269 N.Y.S.2d 7
(2d Dep't 1966); Dobkin v. Chapman, 25 App. Div. 2d 745, 269 N.Y.S.2d
49 (2d Dep't 1966); Deredito v. Winn, 23 App. Div. 2d 849, 259 N.Y.S.2d
200 (2d Dep't 1965); Winterstein v. Pollard, 50 Misc. 2d 354, 270
N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966). See generally The Quarterly
Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JoHn's L. REv. 128, 134-36 (1967);
The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. Joux's L. REV.
644, 648-49 (1967); The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST.
JOHN's L. REV. 462, 475-76 (1967); The Quarterly Survey of New York
Practice, 41 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 279, 296-98 (1966); The Biannual Survey
of New York Practice, 40 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 122, 140-42 (1965).
28 53 Misc. 2d 4, 277 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup.. Ct., Monroe County 1966).
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notice," since it was known that the insurer had no- knowledge
of the defendant's whereabouts. 19
While the decision in the present case is commendable, -it
indicates that much of the law interpreting the statutory language
of 308(4) is being made by the lower and intermediate courts
of New York., Therefore, unless silence means acceptance, practi-
tioners will have to await an interpretation by the Court of
Appeals to know how far the New York courts may go in
fashioning orders under 308(4).
ARTICLE 10- PARTIEs GENERALLY
CPLR 1001.: Dismissal for failure to join necessary party.
Where both a husband and wife signed a contract for the
purchase of a home, the supreme court, in Mechta v. Scaretta,20
held that the wife was a necessary party to an action to recover
the down payment and that in her absence the action could not
proceed.
CPLR 1001(a) provides that necessary parties are persons
who might be inequitably affected by a judgment, or persons
whose absence would preclude complete relief between plaintiff
and defendant. Necessary parties shall be made either plaintiffs
or defendants. 21 When such a person is not joined, and jurisdic-
tion over him cannot be obtained, the court may allow the
action to proceed if justice requires. In determining whether
to allow the action to proceed, CPLR 1001(b) directs the court
to consider: (1) whether plaintiff has another effective remedy if
the action is dismissed for non-joinder; (2) whether the defendant
or the person not joined will be prejudiced thereby; (3) whether
such prejudice might be avoided; (4) whether the court might
fashion a protective measure; and, (5) whether an effective judg-
ment can be rendered in the party's absence.
Compulsory joinder is by no means a new development in
the law. CPLR 1001 did not change the law, but rather was
1953 Misc. 2d at 5, 277 N.Y.S2d at 804. While the court indicated
that the defendant, in fact, had received no notice of the pending action,
even if he had, due process would not be satisfied unless the mode of
service was reasonably calculated to give the defendant notice. See also
Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
2052 Misc. 2d 696, 276 N.Y.S2d 652 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1967).
2 1For example, joint obligees and joint obligors are necessary parties,
but joint tort-feasors are not because they are jointly and severally liable.
2 WamsT=, Komr & Mnrm, Naw YoRK Cnar. PRAcrmcE 1001.06 (1965).
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